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Trust, Workplace Organization, and 
Comparative Economic Development 
 
Abstract 
I propose and test a bottom-up channel through which trust between parties to an 
exchange can go on to affect comparative economic development of societies as a 
whole. My approach revolves around the autonomy that employers (principals) 
grant to workers (agents), which is a key feature of workplace organization. 
Analyses using measures of the cultural component of trust confirm my 
hypothesis that higher social trust leads countries to specialize in industries 
characterized by high levels of work autonomy in their production processes. My 
key contribution is to integrate the microeconomic literature on workplace 
organization with the macroeconomic literature on trust. (JEL D23, F14, L23, 





Keywords: Social capital, work autonomy, industry specialization, comparative advantage, 
division of labor, organizational design, culture 
 Trust, the reliance on another person to act in the interest of the trustor even 
when that person can cheat the trustor without punishment, forms the basis of 
cooperation and is linked to uncertainty reduction and lower transaction costs in 
economic exchange (Arrow 1972; Coleman 1990; Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta 
1988). As an informal enforcement mechanism, trust allows markets to function 
and extend beyond the level of kinship-based communities, in turn sustaining a 
more fine-grained division of labor and increased specialization (Fukuyama 1995; 
Gintis et al. 2005). The macro-level implications of trust—promoting economic 
development and fostering other beneficial societal outcomes—are thus well 
understood (Algan and Cahuc 2010; Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 1993; 
Uslaner 2002; see Algan and Cahuc 2013 for an overview).1 Moreover, the basic 
logic underlying these positive effects of trust—running through enforcement, 
transaction costs, and the division of labor—is also clear. 
However, extant research has narrowly focused on relationships between 
macro-level variables and does not consider how exactly trust between two or 
more parties to an exchange can go on to affect the performance of societies as a 
whole. While lower transaction costs and uncertainty reduction are intuitively 
appealing promoters of economic exchange at the micro level, there is no research 
that establishes an explicit connection between the micro level at which trust 
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 Research into the economic consequences of trust has spawned a broader literature investigating 
the role of informal institutions, notably culture, in economic development (Gorodnichenko and 
Roland 2011; Guiso et al. 2006; see Nunn 2012 for survey). 
 operates and trust’s economic consequences at the macro level. This paper seeks 
to contribute to the literature on the role of culture and informal institutions in 
comparative economic development by forging such a micro-macro connection. 
Specifically, I propose and test a bottom-up channel for the macroeconomic 
consequences of trust that is rooted in the way firms go about organizing and 
managing their operations (i.e., their production processes). To do so, I integrate 
two important developing research areas, one at the micro level and one at the 
macro level. 
First, a growing literature considers workplace organization or organizational 
design to account for firm-level differences in performance and productivity 
(Bloom et al. 2014 and Syverson 2011 review the literature). I expand on earlier 
work to consider work autonomy as a key feature of workplace organization, 
rather than more narrow and concrete human resource management practices.2 
Second, researchers have started to use cross-country cross-industry analyses to 
study domestic institutions as determinants of comparative advantage, especially 
of industry export flows (see Nunn and Trefler 2013 for a survey). Earlier work in 
this area focused on the role of formal institutions, notably legal contract 
enforcement (Levchenko 2007; Nunn 2007). I follow-up with an analysis of the 
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 Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), for example, study what firms actually do when it comes to 
hiring and firing or promoting people, among others. My focus on work autonomy matches most 
closely with Bloom et al. (2012) who find that trust affects the extent to which a multinational firm 
decentralizes and gives authority to local managers. 
 impact of informal institutions, considering social trust as a central domestic 
institution.3 
Following the standard approach in the literature (Nunn 2007; Rajan and 
Zingales 1998; Romalis 2004), an essential feature of my analysis is the 
benchmarking of industries, for which I characterize the organization of work in a 
particular industry by the level of autonomy granted to employees in this industry. 
Trust operates at the micro level where it governs interactions between economic 
actors. Hence, by considering the level of work autonomy that a principal grants 
to an agent I am able to construct an industry measure that embodies micro-level 
evidence on a vital form of exchange between two parties. Many papers in the 
literature on domestic institutions and comparative advantage benchmark 
industries based on industries’ intermediate inputs. The present paper, in contrast, 
employs individual-level data, thus obtaining an industry benchmark that gives a 
most detailed and direct reflection of what goes on in firms within specific 
industries and how people in an industry interact to add value to intermediate 
inputs. Moreover, an important difference with past work is that I use Balassa’s 
(1965) index of revealed comparative advantage to study patterns of industry 
specialization instead of simple export flows. In fact, because specialization 
affects economic development partly because industries differ in their potential 
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 Rauch (1999), among others, considers social networks as informal institutions affecting trade 
flows. Tabellini (2008) examines the effect of trust on industry exports, using the same data as 
Nunn (2007). 
 for improved management techniques and other organizational features, focusing 
on industry specialization provides us with a second micro-macro connection 
between workplace organization and the effect of trust on economic performance, 
albeit an indirect one. The key empirical question that I address in this paper 
subsequently is how trust affects whether countries are specialized in high-
autonomy industries or in low-autonomy industries. 
Incorporating workplace organization in a bottom-up channel for the 
economic consequences of trust, my paper resonates with the broad and long-
standing literature on economic organization and the division of labor (Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972; Becker and Murphy 1992; Williamson 1975). Moreover, trust 
has already been related to the size of organizations (Fukuyama 1995; La Porta et 
al. 1997). In fact, trust is a key issue in business and management as well (Dirks 
and Ferrin 2001; Kramer 1999). Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Costinot 
(2009) provide related theoretical analyses. The former model a firm’s decision to 
adopt a certain technology as a function of contracting institutions, among others, 
which are then linked to comparative advantage. The latter studies a model in 
which institutions allow firms within a country to adopt certain organizational 
practices that affect in which industries the country becomes an exporter. 
Workplace organization, specifically work autonomy, provides the starting 
point for my analysis. A straightforward definition of work autonomy is as “the 
condition or quality of being self-governing or free from excessive external 
 control” (Jermier and Michaels 2001: 1006). I have the following hypothesis: the 
higher a country’s level of trust, the more this country is specialized in industries 
characterized by high levels of work autonomy in their production processes. 
Autonomy for workers is associated with various advantages for firms, deriving 
from the division of labor and specialization in the production process (e.g., 
Becker and Murphy 1992). Granting specialist workers the autonomy to organize 
their productive activities in the way they deem fit results in a more efficient 
production process than when a non-specialist manager tells workers exactly what 
they should be doing. However, a disadvantage of giving employees freedom to 
perform their job in their own way is that, in the absence of monitoring and 
control, it can be difficult to get employees to act in the best interest of the firm, 
as highlighted by the classic principal-agent problem. In short, for firms, work 
autonomy only pays off if this autonomy is accompanied by a certain level of trust 
so that the principal can rely on the agent to foster the principal’s interests despite 
a lack of formal incentives. Otherwise, costs due to shirking are likely to 
outweigh the benefits of having expert workers that can leverage tacit skills and 
uncodified knowledge. I therefore expect that industries characterized by highly 
autonomous work environments will flourish in high-trust societies, while these 
industries will struggle in low-trust societies. More concretely, I find that 
countries will be specialized in those industries for which their informal 
institutional endowments provide a useful resource for firms active in these 
 industries and vice versa.4 
To test my hypothesis, I adopt the cross-country cross-industry estimating 
equation from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Results confirm my hypothesis, 
showing that countries with higher (lower) social trust are specialized in high-
autonomy (low-autonomy) industries. Effect sizes are large and results are robust 
to a variety of checks, including the use of alternative measures of industry work 
autonomy. To identify the causal effect of trust on industry specialization, I 
expand on Algan and Cahuc’s (2010) approach of using trust scores from 
migrants to measure the cultural component of social trust that is independent of 
countries’ economic and institutional environment. The resulting set of trust 
indicators affirms the causal role of trust in determining cross-country patterns of 
industry specialization. Overall, the evidence thus provides strong empirical 
support for the idea that trust interacts with workplace organization to affect the 
comparative economic development of nations. 
This paper, then, makes two main contributions, an empirical one and a 
broader, conceptual one. Extant studies of the economics of trust leave us 
wondering about the exact channel through which trust between parties to an 
exchange affects economies and comparative development. The basic logic—
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 Naturally, trust may affect economic activity both along the intensive and along the extensive 
margin. However, for this paper, I am not interested in such effects strictly but in the more 
fundamental effect of trust on comparative economic development, as measured by industry 
specialization. 
 running through uncertainty reduction and lowering of transaction costs—is 
obvious, but lacks detailed evidence on the steps involved, particularly at the 
micro level, which is the level at which we expect trust to act as an informal 
enforcement mechanism that facilitates exchange between economic actors. My 
main empirical contribution subsequently is to pin down a much-lacking bottom-
up channel for some of the macroeconomic consequences of trust. Starting with 
workplace organization at the micro level and going up all the way to comparative 
economic development at the macro level, this paper’s empirical evidence shows 
how trust between two parties can go on to affect societies as whole. 
The paper’s broader contribution lies in connecting important research areas 
and integrating them to present a more penetrating analysis of comparative 
economic development than heretofore. Institutions, formal ones such as rule of 
law and informal ones such as culture and social trust, are widely recognized as 
vital determinants of the economic performance of nations because they shape the 
attitudes, beliefs, and actions of economic actors. Similarly, there is increasing 
interest in workplace organization and organizational design as key determinants 
of firm performance. Nevertheless, even though the economic performance of 
nations is crucially driven by the performance of firms, these two performance 
literatures have mostly developed disjointedly. My paper, however, shows a way 
of integrating the two strands of research, setting an example for how to forge the 
kind of micro-macro connection that seems vital for better understanding 
 economic development and the role of informal institutions therein. 
 
I. Autonomy as a Feature of Workplace Organization 
 
A. Measuring Work Autonomy 
 
Management scholars have long been interested in features of workplace 
organization, specifically what workers actually experience in their jobs (see 
Hackman and Oldham 1975, Herzberg 1966, Turner and Lawrence 1965, and 
Walker and Guest 1952 for early work). Adam Smith’s (1776) famous description 
of a pin factory is thereby identified as the first contribution on this topic (Oldham 
and Hackman 2010). Issues researched range from the variety or repetitiveness of 
job tasks to the feedback that workers receive and the amount of autonomy that 
they are granted. The typical approach to measuring work autonomy (or other 
features of workplace organization) is via surveys, specifically questionnaire 
items that ask respondents to report on the level of autonomy or freedom that they 
experience in their work (Pierce and Dunham 1976; Sims et al. 1976). Different 
survey instruments are available and the most widely used instruments simply ask 
respondents something along the following lines: “Using this card, please say how 
much the management at your work allows/allowed you to decide how your own 
daily work is organised.” This item is included in the European Social Survey or 
 ESS (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team 2007), a cross-national survey 
of 30 Eurasian countries, and actually the main item that I draw on in this paper. 
Respondents can rate their level of work autonomy from 0, “I have/had no 
influence” to 10, “I have/had complete control.” Of course, many different item 
wordings are possible. The US General Social Survey or GSS (Smith et al. 2012), 
for instance, presents a statement to respondents (“I am given a lot of freedom to 
decide how to do my own work”) and offers four possible answers (“1 - Not at all 
true,” “2 - Not too true,” “3 - Somewhat true,” and “4 - Very true”).5 The basic 
idea is always the same, however, namely that people report on their experienced 
level of work autonomy. 
 
B. Validity of Measured Work Autonomy 
 
A concern with the typical work autonomy measure is that it is subjective, 
based on individuals’ perceptions, which could result in biases. Of course, 
subjective data in general are widely used in economics (e.g., inflation 
expectations) and the concept of work autonomy has already been much studied 
in management (see Jermier and Michaels 2001 for a review). Nevertheless, to 
gather some explicit evidence on the validity of measured work autonomy, I adopt 
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 For this last example, I have reverse coded the original answer categories of the item to let higher 
scores indicate higher levels of work autonomy. 
 the standard approach to assessing construct validity in psychology, which is to 
check how a measured construct relates to other constructs that would 
theoretically relate to the construct of interest in specific ways (Cronbach and 
Meehl 1955). If a construct is valid, it should exhibit logical relationships with 
other constructs, for instance, scores on an intelligence test should not have a 
negative association with scores on the college aptitude test (SAT) but should 
coincide with higher educational attainment on average. 
Taking this approach, I find that measured work autonomy relates to a variety 
of other factors in a manner that provides strong validation of the construct (Table 
A.1 in Appendix A). Notably, managers have higher levels of work autonomy 
than subordinates do and the higher educated are granted more autonomy than 
people with lower levels of education are. In addition, levels of work autonomy 
relate to other perceived features of workplace organization, specifically the 
amount of influence people have on organizational decisions. Furthermore, I find 
the same relationships when using different indicators of work autonomy and data 
collected in different surveys, both nationally (the GSS) and cross-nationally (e.g., 
the ESS) (Panels a, b, and c in Table A.1). Not reported in Table A.1, the ESS and 
GSS further include data on respondents’ tenure with their employer and 
experience in their current job, enabling me to calculate a correlation between 
work autonomy and tenure or experience. Correlations equal .096 (n=18,241; p = 
.000) for tenure (ESS) and .091 (n=4620; p =.000) for current job experience 
 (GSS). These positive correlations support both the idea that principals are more 
willing to trust agents with whom they have a longer relationship and the idea 
that, with experience, an agent accumulates a unique set of skills that is used most 
efficiently when the principal grants the agent the freedom to organize his/her 
work in the way the agent deems fit and with little opportunity for the principal to 
monitor the agent’s performance (on this latter point, see also Table 1 and the last 
paragraph of this section). Overall, patterns found are precisely the patterns that 
we expect from valid measures of work autonomy, strongly suggesting that 
indicators of work autonomy indeed measure what they are supposed to measure. 
Further evidence on the validity of measured work autonomy comes from 
relating the level of work autonomy to other features of organizations. I use the 
GSS data to examine how employees’ level of work autonomy correlates with 
these employees’ personal assessment of their organizations’ performance, 
specifically whether workers find that their employers provide them with the right 
conditions to be productive. Given the limitations of subjective performance 
assessments and the perceptual nature of all the variables involved (both on the 
left-hand side and on the right-hand side), I do no want to emphasize the results of 
this empirical analysis too much. However, I do find a strong positive relationship 
between work autonomy and subjectively assessed organizational performance, 
which supports the validity and relevance of work autonomy (see Table A.2 in 
Appendix A). 
  
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
Finally, in light of the theoretical backdrop to this paper, a most important 
question is how measured work autonomy relates to specialization and the idea of 
acquiring job-specific tacit knowledge and skills. Divided labor in the production 
process means that workers are specialists that have gained unique, uncodifiable 
knowledge on how best to perform and organize their productive activities (e.g., 
Becker and Murphy 1992). As it turns out, there indeed is a strong relationship 
between work autonomy and the acquiring of a unique set of skills (Table 1). 
Specifically, higher levels of work autonomy go together with an increased need 
to learn new things on the job (top rows of Table 1) and, especially, a greater 
requirement of job-specific work experience (bottom rows of Table 1). Hence, 
measures of work autonomy not only have construct validity (Tables A.1 and 
A.2), but are also valid in relation to the standard theories of economic 
organization and the division of labor on which this paper builds. 
 
II. A Measure of Industry Work Autonomy 
 
In this section I construct a measure of industry work autonomy and 
demonstrate its reliability. Valid measures of the level of autonomy that 
 employees are granted at work offer a great opportunity to benchmark industries 
on the basis of micro-level features of their work environments, in turn allowing 
me to establish a bottom-up channel for the macroeconomic consequences of trust 
that is rooted in the economics of workplace organization. 
My approach is to employ individual-level data on work autonomy and 
construct an industry benchmark that captures how people in specific industries 
work together to add value to intermediate inputs. By nature of their production 
processes and how these are organized, industries may be characterized as having 
more or less autonomous work environments. Taking this micro-level approach, I 
ensure that my analysis of the comparative economic development of nations is 
consistent with and, in fact, strongly rooted in our understanding of trust as a 
factor shaping how economic actors interact with each other. More broadly, in my 
approach, institutions, specifically social trust, can affect comparative economic 
development through specific features of industries’ micro work environments 
that are either hampered or fostered by the presence of these institutions. 
I measure industry work autonomy using the first four waves of the cross-
national ESS data set introduced in the previous section. The ESS classifies 
respondents’ industry of occupation using two-digit NACE codes.6 An important 
                                                          
6
 The NACE codes used are of revision 1.1. With the fifth wave of the ESS, the industry 
classification has changed to NACE revision 2. Relying on the first four waves gives us the 
maximum amount of individual-level observations for the calculation of industry autonomy 
scores. 
 feature of my industry work autonomy is that it comprises individual-level data 
from multiple countries and not just one country, as is typical in the literature. A 
problem plaguing cross-country cross-industry studies is so-called benchmarking 
bias, which can shift estimates downwards or upwards (Ciccone and Papaioannou 
2010; Nunn and Trefler 2013). A downward, attenuating bias occurs because the 
benchmarking of industries is subject to random measurement error. The upward, 
amplifying bias derives from the fact that benchmarking industries based on data 
from only one country (e.g., the US) likely results in an industry benchmark that 
is reminiscent of the specific institutions in this country that affect its industrial 
structure. An upward bias, then, occurs because the resulting benchmark is more 
accurate for countries that are institutionally more similar to the country used for 
the original benchmarking of industries. I calculate the measure of industry work 
autonomy using data from 30 highly institutionally diverse countries, which likely 
alleviates the problem of benchmarking bias.7 Nevertheless, as a robustness 
check, I repeat my baseline analysis using two alternatives to my main measure of 
industry work autonomy. For the first alternative measure, I use only individual-
level data from countries that have mean levels of work autonomy below the 
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 The 30 countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. In terms of institutional diversity, these countries cover all five 
legal origins recognized in the literature (common law, French law, German law, socialist law, and 
Scandinavian law) and seven out of the 12 clusters of national culture identified by Hofstede 
(2001), the world’s leading cross-cultural researcher. 
 average of the 30 countries. For the second alternative measure, I use only 
individual-level data from countries that have mean levels of work autonomy 
above the average of the 30 countries (see Table B.1 in Appendix B). Dividing the 
work autonomy data this way ensures that I have two samples comprising roughly 
the same number of individuals when calculating the alternative measures of 
industry work autonomy (see, also, Note 5). At the end of this section, I also 
check the reliability of my industry work autonomy measure, which relates to the 
issue of random measurement error in industry benchmarks. 
I calculate industry work autonomy as the mean level of work autonomy 
reported by all respondents working in a particular industry. Table 2 (Panel a) 
presents the results for the 24 industries for which I also have data on industry 
specialization (see the next section). Although the 24 industries are somewhat 
similar—none belong to the services sector—there is substantial variation in 
average work autonomy. Measured industry differences thereby have face validity 
with the Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks involving much more autonomy in the production process than the 
Manufacture of textiles, for instance. Furthermore, measured differences between 
the 24 industries coincide with our intuition concerning traditional sectors that 
have comparatively little potential for dynamic efficiency gains (e.g., 
Manufacture of tobacco products) and sectors that are more high-tech and have 
comparatively much potential for dynamic efficiency gains (e.g., Manufacture of 
 office machinery and computers). I find similar industry differences for the 
alternative measures of industry work autonomy (Table B.1 in Appendix B). 
To provide a comparative perspective, I also present aggregated autonomy 
scores for the second least autonomous industry, after the Manufacture of textiles 
(Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat, NACE code 10), and for some 
high-autonomy industries also not considered in the empirical analysis (Table 2, 
Panel b). In general, average work autonomy in the sample is below the average 
level of work autonomy across all industries (see bottom rows of Panels a and b in 
Table 2). 
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
Although employing cross-national data alleviates (benchmarking) biases, a 
remaining question is whether the measure of industry work autonomy is reliable 
(e.g., Cronbach and Meehl 1955). A particular concern is whether enough 
workers per industry have responded to the questionnaire item on work autonomy 
to render consistent results for the measured differences in industries’ micro work 
environments. To check the reliability of the industry work autonomy measure, I 
triangulate measures of aggregate work autonomy across three different surveys 
(Table 3). These surveys have employed comparable but not identical 
questionnaire items to measure work autonomy. Moreover, data have been 
 collected in a highly diverse group of countries, notably the US (GSS data), the 
Eurasian countries covered by the ESS data, and other countries from all over the 
world, e.g., Japan, Philippines, Mexico, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, and 
Dominican Republic (ISSP data). Notwithstanding, correlations between the 
various measures of aggregate work autonomy are strong, typically well above 
.70. 
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
 
These high correlations between aggregated autonomy scores constructed 
from different questionnaire items and data collected in countries with highly 
diverse institutional environments indicate that measures of industry work 
autonomy are, in fact, highly reliable, and not nearly as susceptible to 
measurement error as one might expect. Whether we use data from Eurasian 
countries, the US, or a varied set of countries worldwide, the differences in 
aggregate work autonomy that we find are highly similar, independent of the 
sample or the precise measure of work autonomy used. Still, reliability (as 
evidenced by the correlations between the three measures) tends to improve from 
having more individual-level respondents on which to base the work autonomy 
score of an industry (e.g., Panel a of Table 3 versus Panel b of Table 3). The most 
reliable results are obtained when there are at least 100 respondents per industry 
 (Panel c of Table 3). In the empirical analysis, I therefore only include industries 
that meet this observational threshold. As it turns out, all industries depicted in 
Panel a of Table 2 meet this threshold (the lowest number of observations for the 
measure of industry work autonomy is 107). 
 
III. Estimating Equation and Data 
 
The theoretical rationale for my proposed bottom-up channel for the 
macroeconomic consequences of trust involves two simple steps. At the micro 
level, I find that trust offers a solution to the principal-agent problem that occurs 
when firms (principals) grant autonomy to their workers (agents). Specifically, I 
find that the costs due to shirking in the absence of monitoring and control are 
more likely to outweigh the benefits of work autonomy (efficiency gains due to 
specialization) in high-trust societies than in low-trust societies. Correspondingly, 
I expect that, at the macro level, high-trust countries are specialized in industries 
characterized by more autonomous work environments, simply because these 
industries will thrive more in high-trust countries compared to low-trust countries 
and vice versa. To pin down how trust between parties to an exchange can go on 
to affect the comparative economic development of societies as a whole, this 
section subsequently incorporates the micro-level evidence on economic 
exchange embodied in the measure of industry work autonomy in an analysis of 
 the revealed comparative advantage of nations along the lines of Nunn (2007) and 
Romalis (2004). 
 
A. Estimating Equation 
 
I test the hypothesis that social trust generates a comparative advantage in 
high-autonomy industries by estimating the following standard equation: 
 
(1) cittcict4cti3cti2ci10cit εYUuHβHaβHsβTaββlnR ++++++++= . 
 
In this equation, lnRcit denotes the natural logarithm of the revealed comparative 
advantage of country c in industry i at time t, ai is the measure of industry work 
autonomy, and Tc is a country’s trust level. The key term in this equation is the 
interaction between industry work autonomy and trust (aiTc). By my hypothesis, a 
high trust level interacts with workplace organization to generate a comparative 
advantage in high-autonomy industries so that I expect a positive coefficient for 
this trust interaction. 
A concern with the trust interaction is that both social trust (Tc) and industry 
work autonomy (ai) proxy for another set of industry features and country factors 
that also interact to affect industry specialization. Notably, trust and industry work 
autonomy appear closely related to human capital, not least as firms seem more 
 likely to grant autonomy to workers when these workers are better skilled and 
more highly educated.8 Hence, to make sure that we are capturing the genuine 
effect of trust interacting with work autonomy to affect industry specialization 
and not any effect due to human capital and skill intensity, Eq. 1 includes two 
more interaction terms. The first of these interaction terms involves the high skill 
intensity of industries and countries’ human capital endowment (siHct), where the 
subscript t denotes that human capital endowment, just like revealed comparative 
advantage (), can vary over time. The second additional interaction term involves 
industry work autonomy and again countries’ human capital endowment (aiHct). 
Together, these two additional interaction terms help rule out any spurious effects 
that otherwise might be captured by the trust interaction but that, in reality, derive 
from a country’s human capital endowment or from an industry’s level of skill 
intensity. Following the argument as to why the interaction between trust and 
workplace organization may spuriously capture effects driven by human capital 
endowments, I expect positive coefficients for both the high skill intensity 
interaction (siHct) and the work autonomy human capital interaction (aiHct). 
Finally, the estimating equation includes industry (ui) and country fixed 
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 See Romalis (2004) for evidence on human capital as a factor determining international trade 
flows across countries and industries. For work on the effect of trust on human capital, see, for 
example, Coleman (1988). Bjørnskov (2009) provides cross-country evidence on the effect of trust 
on schooling. The relationship between industry work autonomy and human capital intensity is 
apparent from Table A.1 in Appendix A, but also intuitively from gauging some of the industries 
and their mean level of work autonomy, e.g., the Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks, which appears much more skill-intensive than the Manufacture 
of textiles (see the previous section and Table 2). 
 effects (Uc), which is standard. However, as I am able to have repeated measures 
of revealed comparative advantage, I can include year fixed effects (Yt) as well, 
even though is little reason to expect that year-specific measurement error will 
somehow affect my results. Because my main interest is in the effect of social 
trust, which is considered a stable cultural trait of societies, I cluster my standard 




Dependent Variable.—My measure of industry specialization is Balassa’s 
(1965) well-known index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). This index 
defines the revealed comparative advantage of industry i in country c as: RCAic = 
(Xic / Xc) / (Xi / X), where Xic denotes exports of industry i in country c, Xc 
denotes total exports by country c across all industries, Xi denotes total exports of 
industry i in all other countries combined (i.e., the rest of the world), and X 
denotes total exports by all other countries combined. While extant literature 
typically has exports as the dependent variable, I find that Balassa’s index is more 
informative of comparative economic development, as it provides direct evidence 
on the extent to which a country is specialized in a specific industry. Data come 
from the Database for Structural Analysis (known as the STAN database) 
maintained at the OECD (OECD 2010). 
 The RCA data in STAN cover the years 1999-2008. However, human capital 
data are available for fewer years, so that my main sample covers the years 2000 
and 2005-2008. In total, I am able to match industry autonomy scores to data on 
RCA for 24 industries from the STAN database (see Table 2).9 As data on 
Luxembourg are missing, the STAN database has data available for 29 countries, 
all OECD members. The empirical analyses thus concern a total of 696 (= 24 x 
29) country-industry observations. These country-industry combinations are the 
main unit of observation in my analysis. The total number of observations is 3384 
(out of a theoretical maximum of 5 x 696 = 3480 observations). However, as a 
robustness check, below I also analyze a larger sample that does not include data 
on human capital. Table B.1 in Appendix B presents descriptive statistics for the 
industries included in the analysis. Table B.2 in Appendix B depicts the countries 
in the sample. 
Key Independent Variables.—Eq. 1 has two key independent variables. The 
first is the measure of industry work autonomy described in the previous section. 
The second is social trust. I use the measure of trust available from the World 
Values Survey or WVS (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey 
Association 2006; World Values Survey Association 2009). This canonical 
measure derives from the dummy-coded questionnaire item asking respondents 
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 The STAN database covers more industries, but these are not at the two-digit level, for instance, 
because they collapse data for two industries into one. 
 whether they find “most people can be trusted” (score of 1) or “you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people” (score of 0). The WVS has collected trust 
data in five different waves, spanning the period 1981-2008. I follow the standard 
procedure in the literature, which is to calculate country trust scores by 
aggregating responses from all waves, meaning that for most countries I include 
responses from more than one wave. This procedure matches the conception of 
trust as a stable cultural trait of societies with deep historical and biogeographic 
roots (Buggle and Durante 2014; Guiso et al. 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; 
Van Hoorn 2013). Table C.1 in Appendix C presents scores on the trust measure 
for the 29 countries in the sample. 
Other Main Independent Variables.—Eq. 1 contains two other important 
independent variables, one time-varying country-level variable and one variable at 
the industry level. At the country level, I measure human capital endowment 
using data on average years of schooling from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) statistical database (UNDP 2014). This database provides 
the most frequently updated measure of countries’ human capital endowment, 
matching most closely with the 1999-2008 time-series for the dependent variable. 
Data are available for the years 2000 and 2005-2008, and for all countries in the 
sample. Table B.2 in Appendix B presents descriptive statistics, showing that 
human capital endowment has changed quite a bit during the period covered, for 
instance in Germany and Finland. 
 At the industry level, I measure the intensity with which an industry uses 
high-skilled labor in the same way as I have measured industry work autonomy, 
by aggregating individual-level data from the ESS. I again draw on the first four 
waves of the ESS, and construct a dummy variable that gets a score of 1 if the 
respondent has had at least some tertiary education (ISCED classification V1 or 
higher; see Panel c of Table A.1 in Appendix A) and 0 otherwise. Aggregating 
this dummy variable at the industry level renders percentage scores denoting each 
industry’s level of high skill intensity. Percentage scores can range from 2.97% 
(Agriculture, hunting, related service activities) to 20.9% (Manufacture of office 
machinery and computers). Table B.2 in Appendix B presents complete scores for 
all industries in my sample. 
Following the same procedure as just outlined, I also construct an alternative 
measures of industries’ skill intensity that refers to average years of education. I 
use this measure below to assess the robustness of my baseline results. Table B.2 
in Appendix B presents details including the full set of industry scores. 
 
IV. The Empirics of Trust, Workplace Organization, and Comparative 
Economic Development 
 
A. Baseline Results 
 
 Table 4 presents the baseline results, obtained by estimating different 
specifications of Eq. 1. Providing strong support for my hypothesis, there is a 
statistically highly significant interaction effect between trust and workplace 
organization so that societies with higher trust levels are specialized in industries 
characterized by more autonomous work environments, and vice versa (Model 1). 
This relationship between trust, workplace organization, and industry 
specialization remains when controlling for confounding effects associated with 
countries’ human capital endowment and the intensity with which industries use 
high-skilled labor in their production processes (Models 2-4). The coefficients for 
the interaction terms involving human capital both have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant at usual levels when included separately (Models 2-3). 
Including both interaction terms simultaneously, however, neither of the terms is 
statistically significant at usual levels, while the trust interaction is (Model 4). 
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
More important than statistical significance, the trust interaction is also highly 
significant in terms of effect size. As I report standardized beta coefficients, we 
can easily ascertain that a one standard deviation increase in the trust interaction 
is associated with an increase in revealed comparative advantage of about one 
standard deviation, ceteris paribus. Naturally, the magnitude of the coefficient for 
 the trust interaction decreases a bit when adding control variables, but overall the 
relationship between the trust interaction and industry specialization remains 
strong. Effect sizes are especially large compared to other studies of the 
institutional determinants of comparative advantage. Nunn (2007), for instance, 
reports a standardized beta coefficient of about .33 for his interaction term 
involving judicial quality and the contract intensity of an industry, although in his 
models variance explained is much higher (R2 ≈ .75). There is no real discrepancy 
between stronger effect sizes on the one hand and poorer model fit on the other 
hand, however, as these differences reflect that Nunn (2007) does not consider 
differences in countries’ comparative advantage directly but indirectly, via 
differences in industry exports, which are much more dependent on country fixed 
effects than is revealed comparative advantage.10 
In terms of the aim of this paper, these baseline results provide strong support 
for the bottom-up channel that allows trust to affect comparative economic 
development via workplace organization. Trust acts as an informal mechanism 
that promotes the granting of work autonomy to agents by principals, allowing 
industries characterized by highly autonomous micro production environments to 
flourish in high-trust societies, in turn resulting in predictable patterns of industry 
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 Tabellini (2008) uses Nunn’s (2007) data to consider the role of trust in addition to judicial 
quality. His results compare to my results in the same way as Nunn’s (2007) results compare to 
my results, except that the interaction between trust and contract intensity is far less important for 
understanding industry exports than is the interaction between judicial quality and contract 
intensity considered by Nunn (2007). 
 specialization at the macro level. 
 
B. Robustness Checks 
 
To assess the robustness of the baseline results presented in Table 4, I perform 
several additional checks. I start with a very simple and general check that 
explicitly deals with outliers. For this purpose, I re-estimate Eq. 1 (Model 4 in 
Table 4) using quantile regressions and a sample that excludes any observations 
that score more than two standard deviations below or above the mean on either 
revealed comparative advantage (lnRcit) or on the trust interaction (aiTc). Table 
D.1 in Appendix D presents the results. As expected, initial relationships found 
are robust and in all cases the coefficient for the interaction between trust and 
industry work autonomy remains strongly positive and highly statistically 
significant. 
As indicated in the previous section, to address potential benchmarking biases 
(Ciccone and Papaioannou 2010; Nunn and Trefler 2013), I check the robustness 
of my baseline results to the measure of industry work autonomy used. Results 
show that the relationship between trust and industry specialization continues to 
hold when using the two alternative measures of industry work autonomy 
(Models D5 and D7 in Table D.2 in Appendix D). Estimates are less precise, but 
this is as expected given that the two alternative measures are based on less 
 information (i.e., on fewer individual-level observations) than the original 
measure of industry work autonomy and, therefore, have a larger measurement 
error. In terms of attenuating or amplifying bias, using the two alternative 
measures of industry work autonomy renders both a larger and a smaller 
coefficient for the trust interaction compared to models that concern the same 
sample but employ my original measure of industry work autonomy (Model D5 
versus Model D6 and Model D7 versus Model D8). Being in between, I conclude 
that the original industry work autonomy measure renders estimates that are 
largely unbiased, neither over- nor understating the extent to which trust and 
workplace organization interact to shape cross-country patterns of industry 
specialization. 
Expanding on the industry benchmarking check, I also assess whether the 
baseline results are robust to using the alternative measure of industry skill 
intensity that I have constructed. Again, results are largely the same as before 
with the model including the alternative industry skill intensity measures (Model 
D9 in Table D.2) rendering an almost identical coefficient for the trust interaction 
as the model estimated using the original industry skill intensity measure (Model 
4 in Table 4). 
A further issue to consider is that my main sample covers only five years, 
even though data on revealed comparative advantage are available for five more 
years, covering the complete period from 1999 to 2008. As discussed, my main 
 sample is constrained by the availability of data on human capital endowments. 
However, excluding data on human capital and expanding the coverage of the 
sample does not affect results either. In fact, in the larger sample the coefficient 
for the trust interaction is slightly higher than before, 1.35 for Model D10 in Table 
D.2 versus 1.29 for Model 1 in Table 4. 
Finally, a most salient concern with the results presented in Table 4 remains 
the possibility of an omitted variable bias. The two interactions in Eq. 1 that 
involve human capital (siHct and aiHct) mean that I control for the most obvious 
confounders. However, so far, I have not accounted for the potential role of 
features of countries’ formal institutional environment. The quality of contracting 
institutions, in particular, has been found to determine industry export flows 
(Levchenko 2007; Nunn 2007) and institutional quality has further been linked to 
social trust (Aghion et al. 2010; Bjørnskov 2011; Tabellini 2008). I actually find 
that there is little theoretical reason to expect that formal institutional 
arrangements interact with industry work autonomy to affect industry 
specialization in a meaningful way. Rather, given the nature of the concept of 
work autonomy, almost by definition, it does not involve any formal contract or 
agreement between the principal and the agent that could be subject to 
enforcement through formal institutions. Hence, beforehand I do not expect that 
institutional quality will do much to affect the extent to which countries are 
specialized in high- or low-autonomy industries. Nevertheless, to be complete, I 
 seek to rule out any spurious effect that might derive from not controlling for 
quality of formal institutions. Results (Model D11 in Table D.2) are consistent 
with prior expectations, showing that the effect of trust on industry specialization 
is indeed robust to controlling for institutional quality. 
 
C. Dealing with Potential Endogeneity through Measures of the Cultural 
Component of Social Trust 
 
Although the above results are suggestive of trust causally interacting with 
workplace organization to affect comparative economic development, without 
additional evidence we cannot rule out that there is reverse causality between 
social trust and countries’ specialization in certain industries. Indeed, the positive 
relationship between the trust interaction and revealed comparative advantage 
could also be consistent with a process in which countries that are specialized in 
high-autonomy industries tend to develop cultural attitudes and beliefs that 
support the workings of these industries. Ordinarily, one would deal with this 
endogeneity problem via instrumental variables analysis. Instrumenting for trust is 
notoriously problematic, however, as the factor(s) that could instrument for trust 
typically also instrument for other determinants of industry specialization, notably 
quality of formal institutions (e.g., Algan and Cahuc 2013; Tabellini 2008), thus 
violating the exclusion restriction. 
 My solution is to construct different indicators of trust that capture the stable 
cultural component of trust, meaning that these indicators are as much as possible 
independent of economic and institutional influences in general and of 
contemporaneous patterns of industry specialization in particular. I apply two 
approaches to construct two alternative trust indicators each, for four indicators in 
total. The first approach is simply to construct historical indicators that refer to 
trust levels before the start of my sample in 2000. The WVS, which I used to 
calculate my main trust indicator, started collecting responses to the trust item in 
1981. In the 19 years before 2000, enough trust data have been collected that I can 
discard all responses after 1999 and still calculate social trust scores for all 
countries in my sample. In principle, using only individual responses from before 
2000 is enough to rule out any direct effect of industry specialization on this 
measure of social trust, not least as all my models include country fixed effects 
(see Eq. 1). However, as a stricter cut-off, I also apply an additional five-year lag 
between the start of my sample and the last year in which individual trust scores 
have been collected. Table C.1 in Appendix C presents country scores on the two 
trust indicators thus constructed. The pre-1995 trust indicator thereby is available 
for 27 countries, while, as stated, I can calculate pre-2000 trust scores for all 29 
countries in my sample. 
My second approach is to use trust levels reported by migrants to proxy for 
social trust in these migrants’ countries of ancestry (cf. Algan and Cahuc 2010). 
 Though predetermined, a concern with plain historical trust indicators is that they 
are still not completely free from influences other than the purely cultural 
component of trust. Migrants, on the other hand, are a special group, as they can 
still harbor their culturally determined trust attitudes but are not affected by the 
reigning economic and institutional conditions in their ancestry countries, simply 
because they no longer reside in these countries. Accordingly, the remaining 
country-of-ancestry effects are a direct reflection of the cultural component of 
trust, while the only economic or institutional influences on migrants’ trust levels 
are due to the economic and institutional conditions in their destination countries. 
Moreover, when considering second-generation migrants, we can further rule out 
indirect effects associated with the intergenerational transmission of attitudes. 
Parents may make a rational choice as to which attitudes to transfer to their 
offspring, opting for those attitudes that maximize their offspring’s likelihood of 
succeeding in the economic and institutional environments in which they will 
need to function (cf. Bisin and Verdier 2001). If so, the attitudes of a first-
generation migrant could still reflect the economic and institutional conditions of 
the ancestry country. By the same mechanism, however, the attitudes of second-
generation migrants will be void of any non-cultural country-of-ancestry effects, 
as these migrants’ attitudes will be geared fully towards the economic and 
institutional environment of the destination country. The data that I use to 
construct the two indicators of the cultural component of trust based on migrant 
 trust come from the ESS (Waves 1-5 / 2002-2010). Appendix C gives a detailed 
description of the construction of the two indicators. Table C.1 again presents 
country scores.11 
 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
 
Table 5 presents the results for the four trust indicators. In all cases, the trust 
interaction remains highly statistically significant and sizeable. Estimates can be 
less precise, however, but this is understandable given that the alternative trust 
indicators are based on relatively few underlying individual-level observations, 
particularly the one based on data from second-generation migrants. Overall, I 
conclude that trust indeed causally interacts with workplace organization to shape 




The idea of specialization through the division of labor is one of the most 
powerful ideas in economics. Trust subsequently is widely recognized for its role 
as a social lubricant, fostering mutually beneficial exchange and thereby 
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 Compared to the US General Social Survey (GSS) data used by Algan and Cahuc (2010), the 
ESS data are much richer, allowing me to construct these trust indicators for the largest share of 
countries in my sample (and, if needed, many more countries that are not in my sample). 
 sustaining higher levels of specialization. Moreover, many studies show that trust 
is a robust factor in economic development. What is lacking, however, is a clear 
pathway that can take us from the micro logic of trust as a promoter of economic 
exchange to the macro evidence on the effect of trust on economic development. 
In this paper, I have developed such a bottom-up channel, pinning down exactly 
how trust matters for the interaction between economic actors at the micro level in 
a way that affects comparative economic development at the macro level. 
Specifically, my empirical analysis shows that trust interacts with workplace 
organization to determine countries’ comparative advantage and shape cross-
country patterns of industry specialization. 
The paper’s broader contribution lies in the joining of two important 
literatures that so far remained unconnected. Significant advances have been 
made in the literature on the effect of workplace organization and organizational 
design on firm performance (e.g., Bloom et al. 2014; Syverson 2011) and in the 
literature on the macroeconomic consequences of informal institutions, 
particularly trust (e.g., Algan and Cahuc 2013; Gorodnichenko and Roland 2011; 
Guiso et al. 2006). Unfortunately, until now, these developments have been 
happening largely independent from each other. The micro-macro connection that 
I have developed in this paper, however, acts as a lynchpin that brings the two 
literatures together and integrates them. A most fruitful avenue for future research 
is to establish further lynchpins, where the bottom-up channel involving 
 workplace organization, as analyzed in this paper, may provide a guide towards 
integration of other types of microeconomic insights in the study of comparative 
economic development at the macro level. 
Future research could also address some of the limitations of the paper’s 
empirical analysis. Most importantly, data availability has kept me from analyzing 
a global sample of countries, analyzing a sample of OECD countries instead. The 
narrow nature of this sample, covering only countries in relatively advanced 
stages of economic and institutional maturity, has likely biased my estimates 
against finding evidence that trust interacts with workplace organization to affect 
comparative economic development. Nevertheless, we need follow-up research 
both to generalize the idea of a bottom-up, micro-macro channel for the economic 
consequences of (in)formal institutions and to generalize my empirical evidence 
to globally representative samples. 
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Current job: Job requires learning new things  
Not at all true [n=4945] 4.28    (3.71) 
A little true [n=9907] 5.31    (3.37) 
Quite true [n=12,290] 6.23    (3.16) 
Very true [n=11,126] 7.05    (3.01) 
Somebody with right qualification, how long to learn to do 
your job well 
 
1 day or less [n=1532] 4.06    (3.78) 
2-6 days [n=3739] 4.40    (3.57) 
1-4 weeks [n=6162] 5.23    (3.42) 
1-3 months [n=8045] 5.98    (3.27) 
More than 3 months, up to 1 year [n=9819] 6.69    (3.04) 
More than 1 year, up to 2 years [n=4337] 7.05    (2.93) 
More than 2 years, up to 5 years [n=2307] 7.09    (2.95) 
More than 5 years [n=733] 7.24    (2.98) 
Notes. Number of observations in square brackets. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. Data are own calculations based on data from the ESS (Waves 2 and 
5 / years 2004 and 2010) (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team 2007). 
 
 
 Table 2—Autonomy as a Feature of Industries’ Micro Work Environments 
Panel (a): Industries included in empirical analysis 
Industry (NACE classification rev. 1.1, two digits, with code 
in square brackets) 
Industry work 
autonomy (0-10) 
Agriculture, hunting, related service activities [1] 5.88 
Forestry, logging, related service activities [2] 5.61 
Fishing, fish farming and related service activities [5] 6.03 
Manufacture of food products and beverages [15] 4.74 
Manufacture of tobacco products [16] 4.20 
Manufacture of textiles [17] 3.83 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
[18] 3.97 
Tanning and dressing of leather [19] 4.08 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials [20] 
4.79 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products [21] 5.10 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media [22] 6.42 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel [23] 6.09 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products [24] 5.85 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products [25] 4.71 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products [26] 4.74 
Manufacture of basic metals [27] 4.78 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere 
classified [29] 5.29 
Manufacture of office machinery and computers [30] 6.27 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus not 
elsewhere classified [31] 5.12 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus [32] 5.63 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks [33] 6.58 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers [34] 5.08 
Manufacture of other transport equipment [35] 5.83 
Other business activities [74] 6.66 
Mean of industry means for industries included in empirical 
analysis (n=24) 5.30    (.841) 
 Table 2—ctd. 
Panel (b): Selected industries, not included in empirical analysis 
Industry (NACE classification rev. 1.1, two digits, with code 
in square brackets) 
Industry work 
autonomy (0-10) 
Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat [10] 3.91 
Hotels and restaurants [55] 5.47 
Education [80] 6.73 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation [67] 7.24 
Research and development, basic research [73] 7.53 
Mean of industry means for all industries (n=69) 5.80    (.985) 
Notes. Data are own calculations based on data from the first four waves of the 
ESS, which have been held bi-annually in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
 
 Table 3—The Reliability of Measuring Industry Work Autonomy 
Intercorrelations for 




No minimum number of 
observations per two-digit 
occupational category 
Panel (b): 




Minimum 100 observations 












































[n=27] .875 .634 .921 .811 
Mean occupation 
score on work 
autonomy, ISSP 
1 .702 [n=27] 1 .741 1 .849 
Notes. Number of observations in square brackets. Since data on respondents’ industry (e.g., NACE codes) are seldom 
collected in surveys, I have calculated worker autonomy scores for occupations instead. I used data on respondents’ 
occupation measured by ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) codes. I thereby collapsed four-
digit ISCO codes into two-digit codes as a way to make them comparable to the two-digit NACE codes used for Table 
2. Data are own calculations based on data from the ESS (first four waves / years 2002-2008), from the GSS (years 
2002, 2006, and 2010), and from the 2005 ISSP Module on Work Orientation (ISSP Research Group 2013). The ISSP 
data have been collected in the following country regions (32 in total): Australia, West-Germany, East-Germany, UK, 
US, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, 
Philippines, Israel, Japan, Spain, Latvia, France, Cyprus, Portugal, Denmark, Switzerland, Flanders (Province of 
Belgium), Finland, Mexico, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, and Dominican Republic. 
 
 Table 4—Work Autonomy, Trust, and Comparative Advantage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







High skill intensity interaction (siHct) - .471** (.226) - 
.237 
(.363) 
Human capital work autonomy 










Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 3384 3384 3384 3384 
No. of country-industry combinations 696 696 696 696 
R2 adjusted .236 .240 .240 .254 
Notes. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative 
advantage of country c in industry i at time t (see Eq. 1). Sample covers 24 
industries (two-digit NACE) in 29 countries for a total of 696 country-industry 
combinations and spans the years 2000 and 2005-2008. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the country-industry level and bootstrapped with 250 
repetitions. Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5—The Causal Effect of Trust on Patterns of Specialization in High-/Low-
Autonomy Industries 














 (5) (6) (7) (8) 



































Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 3364 3132 3364 3016 
No. of country-industry 
combinations 696 648 696 624 
No. of countries 29 27 29 26 
R2 adjusted .243 .261 .249 .278 
Notes. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative 
advantage of country c in industry i at time t (see Eq. 1). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the country-industry level and bootstrapped with 250 
repetitions. Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 





This appendix consists of four parts, labeled A through D. Each part contains 
one or more tables and some additional explanatory text. Appendix A presents 
detailed evidence concerning the validity of measures of work autonomy, relating 
them to a varied set of other constructs logically expected to be related to work 
autonomy in the same way as scores on an intelligence test are related to 
educational success (cf. Cronbach and Meehl 1955). Appendix B presents scores 
and descriptive statistics for key variables in my analyses, separately for industry-
level variables and country-level variables. Appendix C presents the different 
indicators of social trust that I use in the empirical analysis and, where necessary, 
provides a detailed explanation of how an indicator is constructed. Finally, 
Appendix D presents the results for the additional models that I have estimated to 
check the robustness of the baseline results presented in Table 4. 
  
 
APPENDIX A: VALIDITY OF MEASURED WORK AUTONOMY 
 
Tables A.1 and A.2 report evidence on the validity of measures of work 
autonomy, specifically measures asking respondents to report on the autonomy 
they experience at work. Table A.1 straightforwardly presents evidence on how 
measured work autonomy varies with certain respondent features thought to 
correlate with the level of work autonomy of the respondent. Table A.2 presents 
results for a regression analysis and I therefore discuss these results in a bit more 
detail. 
 
TABLE A.1—Validity of the Work Autonomy Measure 






Yes [n=418] 3.53    (.736) 
No [n=743] 3.31    (.856) 
Highest educational degree  
Less than high school [n=405] 3.35    (.859) 
High school [n=2346] 3.33    (.864) 
Associate/Junior college [n=442] 3.43    (.789) 
Bachelor’s [n=933] 3.44    (.751) 
Graduate [n=512] 3.61    (.641) 
In your job, how often do you take part with others in 
making decisions that affect you? 
 
Often [n=1907] 3.58    (.658) 
Sometimes [n=1663] 3.35    (.794) 
Rarely [n=669] 3.14    (.950) 
Never [n=396] 3.09    (1.08) 
How often do you participate with others in helping set the 
way things are done on your job? 
 
Often [n=1554] 3.58    (.685) 
Sometimes [n=1181] 3.34    (.784) 
Rarely [n=461] 3.12    (.909) 
Never [n=277] 3.00    (1.11) 






Yes [n=7461] 2.20    (.679) 
No [n=15,652] 1.88    (.742) 
  
 
TABLE A.1—Validity of the Work Autonomy Measure, ctd. 





Education level  
No formal qualification [n=2268] 1.84    (.820) 
Lowest formal qualification [n=2763] 1.95    (.807) 
Above lowest qualification [n=4284] 1.96    (.753) 
Higher secondary completed [n=5315] 1.97    (.729) 
Above higher secondary level [n=4743] 2.05    (.705) 
University degree completed [n=4879] 2.15    (.672) 
Applies to respondent’s job: I can work independently  
Strongly agree [n=6302] 2.33    (.694) 
Agree [n=11,088] 2.08    (.697) 
Neither agree nor disagree [n=2937] 1.71    (.657) 
Disagree [n=2854] 1.53    (.666) 
Strongly disagree [n=1080] 1.46    (.657) 






Yes [n=42,319] 7.72    (2.58) 
No [n=101,836] 5.18    (3.64) 
Education (ES-ISCED)  
I, less than lower secondary [n=6849] 4.50    (3.88) 
II, lower secondary [n=14,226] 4.65    (3.80) 
IIIb, upper secondary, vocational or no access to V1 
[n=22,478] 5.33    (3.65) 
IIIa, upper secondary, general and/or access to V1 
[n=17,599] 5.77    (3.48) 
IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree [n=8496] 6.52    (3.31) 
V1, lower tertiary education, BA level [n=9106] 7.34    (2.68) 
V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level [n=9325] 7.42    (2.69) 
Current job: can decide time start/finish work  
Not at all true [n=9692] 4.96    (3.50) 
A little true [n=3690] 6.33    (2.93) 
Quite true [n=2852] 7.41    (2.50) 
Very true [n=2395] 8.20    (2.45) 
  
 
TABLE A.1—Validity of the Work Autonomy Measure, ctd. 





Years of schooling (seven quantiles)  
Quantile 1 (4.82 years of schooling on average) 
[n=14,161] 4.88    (3.87) 
Quantile 2 (8.51 years of schooling on average) 
[n=17,334] 4.94    (3.81) 
Quantile 3 (10.6 years of schooling on average) 
[n=25,500] 5.31    (3.69) 
Quantile 4 (12.0 years of schooling on average) 
[n=22,967] 5.66    (3.56) 
Quantile 5 (13.0 years of schooling on average) 
[n=13,780] 6.06    (3.39) 
Quantile 6 (14.9 years of schooling on average) 
[n=29,562] 6.73    (3.14) 
Quantile 7 (18.7 years of schooling on average) 
[n=20,411] 7.36    (2.73) 
Allowed to influence policy decisions about activities of 
organization (0-10) 
 
0 I have/had no influence [n=38,206] 3.15    (3.65) 
1 [n=10,697] 4.18    (3.16) 
2 [n=8947] 5.28    (2.82) 
3 [n=7264] 5.86    (2.55) 
4 [n=5490] 6.15    (2.35) 
5 [n=11,206] 6.74    (2.26) 
6 [n=6869] 7.31    (1.86) 
7 [n=8417] 7.83    (1.70) 
8 [n=8695] 8.36    (1.51) 
9 [n=4740] 8.88    (1.34) 
10 I have/had complete control [n=14,539] 9.80    (.993) 
Notes. Number of observations in square brackets. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. Data come from the GSS (years 2002, 2006, and 2010), the 2005 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) Module on Work Orientation (ISSP 
Research Group 2013), and the ESS (Waves 1-4 / years 2002, 2004, 2006, and 
2008) (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team 2007). The ISSP measure of 
work autonomy asks respondents “Which of the following statements best 
describes how your daily work is organized?,” giving three possible answers: “1 - 
I am not free to decide how my daily work is organized,” “2 - I can decide how 
my daily work is organized, within certain limits,” and “3 - I am free to decide 
  
 
how my daily work is organized.” As with the GSS item, I have reverse coded 
answer categories for this item so that a higher score indicates more work 
independence. ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of 
Education. The division of respondents’ number of years of schooling in seven 
quantiles (ESS data) has been chosen to match the seven categories of ISCED. 
Waves from the ESS are selected to match the ESS waves that I use later on to 
benchmark industries by their level of work autonomy. 
 
Supplementing the evidence presented in Table A.1 above, Table A.2 below 
further relates employees’ level of work autonomy to the subjectively assessed 
performance of their organizations, specifically whether the conditions in their job 
allow the employee to be productive. As stated in the main text, I find a strong 
relationship between employees’ autonomy and this feature of organizational 
performance. The size of the effect is that a one point increase in work autonomy, 
increases performance by about 0.25 points (both constructs measured on a 1-4 
scale). Moreover, the relationship found is robust to controlling for some standard 
worker characteristics such as sex and age (Model A2) and for other employee 
attributes, for instance, the person’s (un)employment history or whether the 
person is a manager or not (Model A3). I am further able to rule out respondents’ 
general negativity (known as kvetching) or positivity as a factor that drives both 
their self-assessed work autonomy and their assessment of their respective 
organizations’ performance (Model A4). Indeed, controlling for such personal 
sentiments as (dis)satisfaction with household finance or the expected probability 
of leaving one’s job does not overturn the positive relationship between work 
autonomy and organizational performance or render this relationship statistically 
insignificant. Finally, work autonomy continues to exhibit a strong positive 
relationship with organizational performance even when controlling for the extent 
to which the employee’s organization functions smoothly and effectively, which 
itself is a feature of organizational performance that also appears positively 
affected by work autonomy (Model A5). 
 
  
Table A.2—Work Autonomy and Organizational Performance 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) 






























Education dummies included No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager [Base category = No]      










Unemployment history dummies included No No Yes Yes Yes 
Financial satisfaction [Base category = More or less 
satisfied]      
Pretty well satisfied (0/1) - - - .062** (.027) 
.042* 
(.023) 
Not satisfied at all (0/1) - - - -.116*** (.027) 
-.063*** 
(.023) 
Missing data (0/1) - - - -.032 (.041) 
-.020 
(.035) 
Dummies on likelihood of losing job included No No No Yes Yes 
Dummies on how often job interferes with family life 
included No No No Yes Yes 
  
Table A.2— Work Autonomy and Organizational Performance, ctd. 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) 
Organization runs in a smooth and effective manner (1-4) - - - - .462*** (.012) 
No. of obs. 4586 4586 4586 4586 4586 
R2 adjusted .087 .095 .093 .112 .340 
Notes. Dependent variable is about whether job conditions allow for productivity. The questionnaire item measuring 
these conditions for productivity is part of an item battery asking respondents to describe their job: “Now I’m going to 
read you a list of statements that might or might not describe your main job. Please tell me whether you (1) strongly 
disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, or (4) strongly agree with each of these statements.” The specific text reads as follows: 
“Conditions on my job allow me to be about as productive as I could be.” The item on the organization running 
smoothly and effectively is part of the same series: “The place where I work is run in a smooth and effective manner.” 
As with the work autonomy item, I have reverse coded answer categories for these two items so that higher scores 
indicate higher performance. The item on unemployment history asks respondents whether “At any time during the last 
ten years, have you been unemployed and looking for work for as long as a month?” The item on financial satisfaction 
reads as follows: “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your 
family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less 
satisfied, or not satisfied at all?” The dummies on the likelihood of job loss derive from an item asking respondents 
“Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid off--very likely, 
fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?” Finally, the dummies on work interfering with family life derive from 
an item asking respondents “How often do the demands of your job interfere with your family life.” Categorical or 
dummy independent variables are converted into dummies with a category added for cases with missing data, which 
allows me to include this independent variable without losing observations. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
  
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
This appendix presents information on the main sample. Table B.1 thereby concerns industry-level variables and 
contains data on two types of variables. The first variable is the dependent variable, revealed comparative advantage or 
RCA, for which I present summary statistics for each of the 24 industries in my sample. The second type of variable are 
independent variables in my analysis and concern the benchmarking of industries, both in terms of work autonomy and 
in terms of the intensity with which they use high skilled labor as an input. 
 
Table B.1—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), Alternative Measures of 
















































5.24 7.59 2.97% 8.77 




4.36 7.28 5.13% 10.6 





5.26 - 3.37% 9.36 
  
Table B.1—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), Alternative Measures of 
















































4.02 5.80 5.70% 10.8 




- - 5.15% 9.44 




3.38 4.66 2.98% 9.16 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and 




3.68 4.68 2.47% 9.70 




3.91 4.93 3.69% 8.89 
Manufacture of wood and of products of 
wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture 




4.13 6.02 3.94% 10.4 
  
Table B.1—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), Alternative Measures of 
















































4.15 5.78 3.28% 10.8 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of 




5.76 6.76 13.2% 12.8 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 




- - 12.0% 12.2 





4.88 6.67 14.7% 12.7 





3.64 5.66 5.91% 11.2 





3.91 5.96 5.75% 10.7 
  
Table B.1—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), Alternative Measures of 















































3.73 5.73 5.65% 10.9 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment not 




3.99 6.66 9.17% 12.0 





- 6.68 20.9% 13.7 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 




4.18 6.16 8.98% 11.7 
Manufacture of radio, television and 




4.17 6.44 11.9% 12.8 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 




5.08 7.15 14.0% 12.9 
  
Table B.1—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), Alternative Measures of 
















































4.06 5.93 8.30% 11.9 





4.76 6.51 8.97% 11.9 





















Notes. Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets. The construction of the two 
alternative measures of industry work autonomy, one based on individual-level data from countries that have mean 
levels of mean work autonomy below the sample average and one based on individual-level data from countries that 
have mean levels of mean work autonomy above the sample average, is described in the main text. Following the 
results of the reliability analysis (Section II and Table 3 in the main text), I only consider alternative industry work 
autonomy scores based on responses from at least 100 individuals. This criterion results in missing industry work 
autonomy scores for some industries in the analysis. For RCA, fewer than 145 observations (5 years x 29 countries) 
  
indicates that an RCA score is missing for this industry for at least one country in at least one year. As mentioned in the 
main text, I construct the two measures of industry skill intensity in the same way as the industry work autonomy 
measure, meaning that I aggregate individual-level data from the ESS (first four waves / years 2002-2008) at the 
industry level. Although they have the same survey as their source, the data for these two measures is rather different. 
High skill intensity is measured as the percentage of people employed in an industry with an educational classification 
of at least some tertiary education (ISCED V1 or higher). The ISCED measure of a respondent’s education level is 
constructed by the ESS project team by recording the highest degree that a respondent has obtained, which is country-
specific, and then harmonizing the recorded degree to fit the cross-country ISCED classification. General skill 
intensity, in contrast, is measured using respondents’ answer to the survey item that asks them how many years of 
education they have. See Panel c of Table A.1 for more information on the education data in the ESS. The measure of 
high skill intensity is the main measure that I use in my empirical analyses, using the general skill intensity measure in 
a robustness check. Following the procedure for industry work autonomy, I have checked that industry skill intensity 
scores are based on at least 100 individual observations. 
 
Supplementing the industry-level data presented in Table B.1 above, Table B.2 below concerns data on country-
level time-varying independent variables, for which I present summary statistics for each of the 29 countries in my 
sample. 
 
Table B.2—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Time-Varying Independent Variables 
Country Human capital endowment (years of schooling) Institutional quality (rule of law) 
 12.0 1.73 
Australia [5] [5] 
 (.055) (.026) 
 9.98 1.90 
Austria [5] [5] 
 (.540) (.058) 
  
Table B.2—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Time-Varying Independent Variables, ctd. 
Country Human capital endowment (years of schooling) Institutional quality (rule of law) 
 10.5 1.27 
Belgium [5] [5] 
 (.313) (.050) 
 12.1 1.74 
Canada [5] [5] 
 (.537) (.064) 
 12.7 .794 
Czech Republic [5] [5] 
 (.462) (.111) 
 11.1 1.94 
Denmark [5] [5] 
 (.321) (.081) 
 9.76 1.93 
Finland [5] [5] 
 (.873) (.029) 
 9.94 1.42 
France [5] [5] 
 (.391) (.023) 
 11.9 1.68 
Germany [5] [5] 
 (.760) (.056) 
 9.62 .801 
Greece [5] [5] 
 (.576) (.020) 
  
Table B.2—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Time-Varying Independent Variables, ctd. 
Country Human capital endowment (years of schooling) Institutional quality (rule of law) 
 11.5 .856 
Hungary [5] [5] 
 (.152) (.030) 
 9.90 1.88 
Iceland [5] [5] 
 (.354) (.065) 
 11.4 1.67 
Ireland [5] [5] 
 (.122) (.119) 
 9.44 .452 
Italy [5] [5] 
 (.602) (.208) 
 11.2 1.31 
Japan [5] [5] 
 (.270) (.046) 
 11.1 .896 
South Korea [5] [5] 
 (.311) (.086) 
 7.90 -.511 
Mexico [5] [5] 
 (.316) (.121) 
 11.1 1.75 
Netherlands [5] [5] 
 (.224) (.019) 
  
Table B.2—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Time-Varying Independent Variables, ctd. 
Country Human capital endowment (years of schooling) Institutional quality (rule of law) 
 12.2 1.82 
New Zealand [5] [5] 
 (.152) (.041) 
 12.5 1.92 
Norway [5] [5] 
 (.537) (.068) 
 9.70 .469 
Poland [5] [5] 
 (.122) (.118) 
 7.24 1.08 
Portugal [5] [5] 
 (.270) (.100) 
 11.5 .466 
Slovakia [5] [5] 
 (.179) (.106) 
 9.74 1.15 
Spain [5] [5] 
 (.391) (.136) 
 11.6 1.84 
Sweden [5] [5] 
 (.313) (.064) 
 10.7 1.86 
Switzerland [5] [5] 
 (.239) (.056) 
  
Table B.2—Sample and Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Time-Varying Independent Variables, ctd. 
Country Human capital endowment (years of schooling) Institutional quality (rule of law) 
 6.04 .031 
Turkey [5] [5] 
 (.313) (.082) 
 9.02 1.66 
UK [5] [5] 
 (.249) (.078) 
 13.2 1.58 
US [5] [5] 
 (.089) (.044) 
Notes. Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets. The measure of institutional 
quality is the rule of law index from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators project (World Bank 2013). 
 
  
APPENDIX C: TRUST INDICATORS AND THEIR CONSTRUCTION 
 
Table C.1 below reports country scores on the different trust indicators that I use in the empirical analysis. I have 
one main indicator and four indicators designed specifically to enable causal identification of the effect of trust on 
industry specialization. The main trust indicator (first column) is based on all available data from the World Values 
Survey or WVS. As discussed in the main text, for the historical trust indicators, I have limited the WVS data from 
which to calculate country trust scores to individual responses collected before the year mentioned, either before 2000 
or before 1995. For most countries, limiting the sample to responses collected at a date further in the past reduces the 
number of individual responses on which the measure of social trust is based, but this need not always be the case. 
 
Table C.1—Country Trust Levels for Different Measures of Trust 











Australia 44.6%    [4617] 43.1%    [3214] 48.2%    [1189] .098 .891 
Austria 32.7%    [2716] 32.7%    [2716] 31.8%    [1301] .027 .149 
Belgium 31.3%    [5401] 31.3%    [5401] 32.3%    [3577] .134 .182 
Canada 44.5%    [6907] 51.1%    [2890] 51.1%    [2890] .475 -.751 
Czech Republic 26.7%    [5939] 26.7%    [5939] 27.4%    [2975] -.063 -.135 
Denmark 58.8%    [3037] 58.8%    [3037] 55.1%    [2051] 1.06 -.071 
Finland 56.5%    [4525] 55.2%    [2510] 59.2%    [1541] .625 -.388 
France 21.9%    [4612] 22.8%    [3616] 23.9%    [2056] -.131 .154 
Germany 34.3%    [8684] 34.3%    [6786] 32.9%    [2893] .115 .343 
Greece 23.7%    [986] 23.7%    [986] - -.082 -.221 
Hungary 26.9%    [3999] 26.9%    [3999] 29.9%    [2377] .361 -.195 
Iceland 41.3%    [2506] 41.3%    [2506] 41.4%    [1581] .598 1.55 
  
Table C.1—Country Trust Levels for Different Measures of Trust, ctd. 











Ireland 41.5%    [3150] 41.5%    [3150] 44.0%    [2158] .380 .799 
Italy 31.7%    [6133] 32.2%    [5180] 31.9%    [3234] -.033 -.288 
Japan 41.6%    [5280] 41.8%    [3000] 41.6%    [2010] 1.05 - 
South Korea 31.7%    [5778] 33.8%    [3394] 35.8%    [2147] .617 1.37 
Mexico 24.1%    [8432] 27.3%    [5387] 24.5%    [3156] .607 - 
Netherlands 50.6%    [4030] 52.6%    [3034] 48.9%    [2037] .414 .171 
New Zealand 50.0%    [2067] 49.1%    [1162] - .427 - 
Norway 66.4%    [4250] 63.9%    [3232] 63.2%    [2114] .838 .946 
Poland 23.3%    [4819] 24.2%    [3864] 31.8%    [1716] -.010 .023 
Portugal 17.4%    [2124] 17.4%    [2124] 21.7%    [1149] -.302 -.280 
Slovakia 21.3%    [3885] 21.3%    [3885] 22.0%    [1550] .026 -.680 
Spain 32.8%    [10,690] 34.4%    [8342] 34.6%    [6044] .015 -.284 
Sweden 63.5%    [4714] 62.3%    [3751] 61.6%    [1820] .487 .287 
Switzerland 43.8%    [3181] 39.4%    [1994] 42.6%    [863] .454 -.114 
Turkey 11.3%    [8790] 7.1%    [2904] 10.0%    [1012] -.183 -.238 
UK 35.9%    [5622] 37.2%    [4600] 43.4%    [2567] .313 -.043 


















Notes. Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets. 
 
In contrast to the trust indicators based on WVS data (first three columns in Table C.1), the final two trust 
  
indicators are constructed especially as measures of the cultural component of trust that is stable and independent of 
economic and institutional influences. I construct these indicators using data from the ESS (Waves 1-5 / years 2002-
2010). The ESS trust item is almost identical to the WVS trust item, asking respondents to answer the following 
question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?,” with answers ranging from 0, “You can’t be too careful” to 10, “Most people can be trusted.” 
The approach to constructing these two measures is to regress individual trust scores on a set of independent 
variables. The most important independent variables are the dummy variables that represent the country of ancestry of 
first- or second-generation migrants, as I use the estimated coefficients for these dummies to measure the cultural 
component of trust. Other independent variables are added as control variables. The main control variables are 
dummies for the destination country of migrants, which capture variation in trust scores due to living in a particular 
economic and institutional environment. I further control for age (10 cohort dummies), sex, marital status, employment 
status, income category, religious denomination (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Other Christian 
denomination, Jewish, Islamic, Eastern religions, Other non-Christian religions), and year fixed effects. In case of first-
generation migrants, I additionally control for the time the respondent has spent in the destination country (a set of 
dummies). The reason for controlling for time spent in the destination country is that these variables are thought to 
capture, to some extent at least, the strength of both remaining influences of the ancestry country’s economic and 
institutional environment and of the novel influences of the destination country’s economic and institutional 
environment on respondents’ level of trust. As for the regression analysis reported on in Table A.2, when using 
categorical independent variables, I add a category for cases with missing data. 
A key feature of the measurement of the cultural component of trust is the identification of first- and second-
generation migrants and their ancestry countries. I identify first-generation migrants by respondents’ answers to the 
item asking “Were you born in [country]?” and I limit the sample for the regression to individuals who answered 
negatively to this question. For these individuals I subsequently identify their country of ancestry by the answer to the 
item asking “In which country were you born?” The ESS data comprise a variety of countries in which such first-
generation migrants were born, including—importantly—all countries in my analysis of industry specialization. I thus 
create 29 dummy variables for the country of ancestry of first-generation migrants, using all other possible countries of 
ancestry as the base category. The sample for the regression involving first-generation migrants comprises 20,958 
individuals, 8056 of which have ancestry in one of the 29 countries in my main analysis. 
  
In similar fashion, I identify second-generation migrants by respondents’ answers to three survey items. I start by 
selecting respondents that answered positively to the item asking “Were you born in [country]?” The other two items 
ask “Was your father born in [country]?” and “Was your father born in [country]?” respectively. I classify a respondent 
as a second-generation migrant when their father, their mother, or both their parents were not born in the destination 
country, while the respondent was. I subsequently identify second-generation migrants’ country of ancestry using the 
two items asking “In which country was your father born?” and “In which country was your mother born?” In 
principle, a respondent’s father and mother can be born in different countries, in which case I select the country in 
which the respondent’s mother was born as the ancestry country. Again, the ESS data comprise a variety of countries in 
which the parents of second-generation migrants were born. Compared to first-generation migrants, second-generation 
migrants are much rarer, however. The sample for the regression involving second-generation migrants therefore 
comprises 6242 individuals, 2083 of which have ancestry in any one of the 29 countries in my main analysis. In terms 
of country-of-ancestry dummies, I can include 26 such dummies, meaning that I have to drop three countries from the 
analysis. The base category for this set of dummies is again formed by all other possible countries of ancestry. 
Table C.2 below presents selected regression results for the two models thus estimated, the first concerning first-
generation migrants (Model C1) and the second concerning second-generation migrants (Model C2). Given the 
relatively low number of observations for Model C2 (2083), which are also not evenly distributed over the 26 countries 
of ancestry that are present in the sample, estimates can be imprecise. However, overall model fit, both of Model C2 
and of Model C1, is comparable to model fit reported by Algan and Cahuc (2010) (R2 ≈ .10). 
 
Table C.2—Selected Regression Results for the Construction of Measures of the Cultural Component of Trust 
 Model for first-generation 
migrant trust 
Model for second-generation 
migrant trust 
 C1 C2 
Country-of-ancestry dummies Yes Yes 
Country-of-destination dummies Yes Yes 
Time spent in destination country Yes No 
Sex [1 = male] .028    (.035) .093    (.064) 
Religious denomination Yes Yes 
  
Table C.2—Selected Regression Results for the Construction of Measures of the Cultural Component of Trust, ctd. 
 Model for first-generation 
migrant trust 
Model for second-generation 
migrant trust 
 C1 C2 
Education Yes Yes 
Income category Yes Yes 
Age cohort [Base category = Age data missing]   
First decile .294    (.235) .026    (.362) 
Second decile .136    (.227) -.266    (.356) 
Third decile .206    (.226) -.007    (.356) 
Fourth decile .291    (.226) .176    (.355) 
Fifth decile .399*    (.227) .180    (.355) 
Sixth decile .449**    (.227) .059    (.357) 
Seventh decile .449**    (.228) .077    (.359) 
Eighth decile .605***    (.230) .262    (.367) 
Ninth decile .511**    (.232) .211    (.372) 
Tenth decile .663    (.234) .440    (.377) 
Employment status [Base category = 
Employment status data missing]   
Paid work .168    (.182) .458    (.308) 
Education .332*    (.198) .873***    (.325) 
Unemployed, looking for job -.117    (.195) .328    (.335) 
Unemployed, not looking for job -.181    (.214) .375    (.374) 
Permanently sick or disabled -.265    (.206) -.340    (.362) 
Retired -.013    (.187) .432    (.324) 
Community or military service .986***    (.373) .909    (.595) 
Housework, looking after children, others .078    (.187) .536*    (.322) 
Other .169    (.230) .534    (.384) 
  
Table C.2—Selected Regression Results for the Construction of Measures of the Cultural Component of Trust, ctd. 
 Model for first-generation 
migrant trust 
Model for second-generation 
migrant trust 
 C1 C2 
Marital status Yes Yes 
No. of observations 20,958 6242 
R2 adjusted .098 .106 
Notes. The dependent variable is trust (0-10). The set of dummies indicating time spent in the destination country 
combines two items in the ESS that have been included in different waves. One item asks respondents how long ago 
they first came to live in the country (if applicable) and the other item asks respondents in what year they first came to 
live in the country (if applicable). The education dummies refer both to respondents’ educational attainment according 
to the ISCED classification and to respondents’ educational attainment in terms of years of education, where the latter 
is divided into seven quantiles, just as for Panel c of Table A.1. Including both sets of dummies ensures that I control 
for educational differences in the most comprehensive way possible, while retaining the largest possible sample. The 
set of dummies indicating income category also combines two items in the ESS that have been included in different 
waves, one coding income category on a 1-10 scale and one coding income category on a 1-12 scale. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
  
APPENDIX D: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
As stated, this appendix presents detailed results for the additional models that I have estimated to check the 
robustness of the baseline results (Table 4 in the main text). 
 
Table D.1—Sensitivity Analysis of the Relationship Between Trust and Comparative Advantage in High-/Low-
Autonomy Industries 
 Quantile regressions Outliers removed 
(-2SD,+2SD) 
 25% 50% 75% 
 (D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) 































Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 3384 3384 3384 3050 
No. of country-industry combinations 696 696 696 646 
No. of countries 29 29 29 29 
R2 .220 .213 .154 .249 
Notes. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in industry i at 
time t (see Eq. 1). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country-industry level. Coefficients are 
standardized beta coefficients. 
  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
  
Table D.2—Robustness Check for Alternative Measures of Industry Work Autonomy, an Alternative Measure of 
Industry Skill Intensity, Different Samples, and Controlling for Institutional Quality 
 
Alternative industry 
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Trust interaction with 
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Trust interaction with 
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General skill intensity 
interaction (siHct) - - - - 
.511 
(.496) - - 
Institutional quality 








Table D.2—Robustness Check for Alternative Measures of Industry Work Autonomy, an Alternative Measure of 
Industry Skill Intensity, Different Samples, and Controlling for Institutional Quality, ctd. 
 
Alternative industry 
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.237 
(.397) 


























Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 2987 2987 2987 2987 3384 6670 3384 
No. of country-
industry combinations 609 609 609 609 696 696 696 
No. of countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R2 adjusted .234 .242 .305 .306 .242 .240 .241 
Notes. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in industry i at 
time t (see Eq. 1). The industries that have been dropped differ for the two alternative measures of industry work 
autonomy (see Table B.2 in Appendix B). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country-industry level 
and bootstrapped with 250 repetitions. Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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